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INTRODUCTION
Today, electronic communication is pervasive. In particular, e-
mail is now one of the most popular means of communication. The 
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numbers are staggering. By as early as 2000, the number of regular 
e-mail users in the United States had exceeded 100 million.1
Annually, the number of e-mails sent domestically approaches seven 
trillion.2
For their part, American businesses rely heavily on e-mail. 
Office workers exchange twenty-five billion e-mail messages daily.3
Businesses send well more than a trillion e-mail messages annually.4
One company, Microsoft, receives approximately ten million e-mails 
every day.5 Businesses depend on e-mail communication so 
extensively that many businesses give their employees work e-mail
accounts:
A work email account is an employer-provided email account furnished to 
each employee in which the address usually appears as some version of 
the individual employee’s name followed by “@” followed by some 
variation on the employer’s business name. The account uses the 
employer’s technology infrastructure, typically an enterprise software 
system that operates on the employer’s email server. A work email 
account differs from a personal, password-protected, web-based email 
account, also known as webmail, which the employee may obtain through 
Google, Hotmail, or other services.6
Since employees spend so many of their daylight hours at 
work, it was virtually inevitable that they would use their work e-
mail accounts for personal, as well as business, purposes.7 It is not 
1. Patricia Nieuwenhuizen, E-mail: The Smoking Gun of the Future,
NAT’L L.J., Dec. 11, 2000, at B9.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also David M. Remnitz, Electronic Mail: Key Issues for 
Corporate Counsel in Discovery, 72 U.S.L.W. 2339, 2340 (2003) (“[I]t is estimated 
that more than 2 billion e-mails are sent in America daily . . . .”).
4. Kristin M. Nimsger, Same Game, New Rules: E-Discovery Adds 
Complexity to Protecting Clients and Disadvantaging Opponents, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2002, at 28 (“In 2000, an estimated 1.4 trillion e-mail messages were sent 
from businesses in North America, up from 40 billion in 1995.”); see also Bruce E. 
Jameson, Document Retention and Electronic Discovery, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Sept. 
2004, at 45, 46.
5. Proposed Rules on E-Discovery Debated; Cost of Discovery Cited as 
Prod to Settlement, 73 U.S.L.W. 2405, 2405 (2005) (“Microsoft Corp. received 
roughly double the amount of e-mail in 2004 than it received in 2003, Greg 
McCurdy, senior litigation attorney for Microsoft, testified. The company’s IT 
network now receives 250 million to 300 million e-mails a month.”).
6. In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8168-VCL, 2013 WL 4772670, at *4 
n.1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2013) (citation omitted).
7. United States v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106269, at *34 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009) (“[I]t is indisputable that employees 
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only that employees spend a large number of hours at work. 
Moreover, their work hours roughly coincide with the work schedule 
of many kinds of professionals whom the employees have occasion 
to consult for personal reasons. Thus, in numerous instances, 
employees have used their work accounts for communicating with 
confidants such as attorneys8 and therapists. And, as is to be 
expected, employees frequently utilize the account to send messages 
to their spouses.
When employers anticipated or realized that their employees 
were doing so, employers began regulating the use of work e-mail 
accounts. In employee handbooks and policy manuals, some 
employers promulgated policies allowing their employees to put 
their work account to “‘[i]ncidental and occasional personal use’”
during business hours.9 Other employers permit their employees to 
utilize their work e-mail account for personal reasons only after 
business hours.10 Still other employers purport to completely ban 
employees’ personal use of the account.11 Many employers have 
gone farther. These employers not only prohibit or limit employees’
personal use of the work e-mail account, but they also expressly 
reserve the right to monitor employees’ e-mails. These employers 
police employee e-mails not only to ensure that employees are 
observing restrictions on personal use, but also for “legal 
compliance, legal liability, performance review, productivity 
measures, and security concerns.”12
The question has arisen of whether these employer restrictions 
and monitoring policies preclude evidentiary privileges, such as 
attorney–client13 and spousal,14 from attaching to employee e-mails 
to confidants on the employee’s work account. The number of 
with pressing personal legal affairs (i.e., a divorce, a lawsuit) sometimes feel the 
need to communicate with their counsel while at work.”).
8. See, e.g., In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *1.
9. Id. at *5 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank,
No. 5:10-0906, 2011 WL 5201430, at *2, *6 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011)).
10. Id. at *6.
11. Id. at *5 n.4 (citing Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 
2004 WL 2066746, at *21 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004)).
12. Id. at *4 n.2 (citing TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 155, 162 (Ct. App. 2002)).
13. See, e.g., id. at *4.
14. See, e.g., SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re Reserve Fund Sec. & 
Derivative Litig.), 275 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Oil Spill by the Oil 
Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” No. MDL 2179, 2011 WL 1193030, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 
28, 2011).
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judicial opinions posing this issue is increasing exponentially.15
Likewise, the volume of legal commentary on the question is 
growing quickly.16 In some cases the question has been whether, in 
later litigation, the employee could assert the privilege against her 
employer, while in other cases the issue has been whether the 
employee could claim the privilege against a third party.17 The 
litigation has produced splits of authority on several questions, 
including whether related federal18 or state19 statutes override20 the 
normal common-law or statutory privilege rules. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457 (RRM)(RML), 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013); Reserve Mgmt. Co., 275 F.R.D. 
at 156; In re Oil Spill, 2011 WL 1193030, at *1; DeGeer v. Gillis, No. 09 C 6974,
2010 WL 3732132, at *5-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2010); Miller v. Blattner, 676 F.
Supp. 2d 485, 497 (E.D. La. 2009); Leor Exploration & Prod. L.L.C. v. Aguiar, Nos.
09-60136-CIV, 09-60683-CIV, 2009 WL 3097207, at *2-4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 
2009); Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 
WL 1318387, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 
B.R. 247, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670,
at *1; Scott v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438-39 (Sup. Ct. 2007); 1
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.8.1, at 777 n.51 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2d ed. 2010
& Supp. 2014) (collecting cases and articles involving the issue of privileged e-
mails). Two states, California and New York, have amended their privilege statutes 
to make it clear that a message is not unprivileged merely because it was sent in 
electronic form. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 917(b) (West 2014) (“A communication 
between persons in a relationship listed in subdivision (a) does not lose its privileged 
character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means . . . .”); 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney 2014).
16. See, e.g., 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.8.2, at 806 n.187 
(collecting cases and articles involving the issue of privileged employee e-mails); 
John M. Barkett, The Challenge of Electronic Communications: Privilege, Privacy, 
and Other Myths, LITIGATION, Fall 2013, at 17; John Gergacz, Employees’ Use of 
Employer Computers to Communicate with Their Own Attorneys and the Attorney–
Client Privilege, 10 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH J. 269 (2006); W. William Hodes, 
Confidentiality and Privilege in the Workplace: Their Computer, Their Rules, LAW.
USA, Nov. 1, 2011, available at 
http://lawyersusaonline.com/blog/2011/11/01/confidentiality-and-privilege-in-the-
workplace-their-computer-their-rules/; Richard L. Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer,
58 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (2009); James W. Martin, Why You Need an Employee 
Policy for Electronic Information, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 2013, at 13; Kelcey Nichols,
Note, Hiding Evidence from the Boss: Attorney–Client Privilege and Company 
Computers, 3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 6 (2006); Donald H. Nichols, Window 
Peeping in the Workplace: A Look into Employee Privacy in a Technological Era,
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1587, 1600-01 (2001).
17. See, e.g., In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *12-13.
18. Id. at *9 (discussing the Federal Wiretap Act). 
19. Id. at *11 (discussing the Maryland Wiretap Act).
20. Id. at *9.
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Although the current body of case law leaves a large number of 
privilege issues unresolved, this Article focuses on only two of the 
most important unsettled questions. First, should the same 
confidentiality standard apply whether the employee’s opposing 
litigant is the employer or a third party? And second, does the 
employer’s issuance of a formal policy banning employee’s personal 
use of the work e-mail account absolutely preclude a privilege such 
as attorney–client from attaching to an employee’s message to a 
confidant on the work account?
This Article has selected those two questions because the 
resolution of both questions turns on a proper understanding of the 
confidentiality concept in privilege law. That concept is the privilege 
doctrine most directly related to the protection of the private sphere 
of human activity and “[o]ne of the most venerated and important 
tenets of [Western] political philosophy since the time of the Greeks 
has been the dichotomy between the private and public realms.”21
Furthermore, in practice, confidentiality has become the central 
concept in contemporary privilege doctrine. Litigation over that 
concept accounts for more than three-quarters of the published 
opinions dealing with communications privileges.22 In the words of 
one court, protecting “[c]onfidentiality . . . is the essence” of
contemporary privilege law.23
The confidentiality concept not only comes into play in the vast 
majority of litigated privilege disputes; the concept is also one of the 
most frequently misapplied. As two of the leading privilege 
commentators, Professors Robert Mosteller and Ken Broun, have 
noted, in recent years there has been a growing judicial tendency to 
confuse the concept of confidentiality in the law of privilege with the 
concept of privacy in other contexts, such as the Fourth 
Amendment.24 In a 2009 article, Professors Mosteller and Broun 
21. RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 3 (1999); see also RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 118-19 (1987); 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, §
5.3.3, at 360-61.
22. Paul R. Rice, Our Late Great Secrets?, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 1999, at 
18.
23. In re Royce Homes, L.P., 449 B.R. 709, 723 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
24. See Robert P. Mosteller & Kenneth S. Broun, The Danger to 
Confidential Communications in the Mismatch Between the Fourth Amendment’s 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” and the Confidentiality of Evidentiary 
Privileges, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147 (2010); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 
Dangerous Trend Blurring the Distinction Between a Reasonable Expectation of 
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demonstrated that by confusing the two concepts, the courts have 
sometimes reached incorrect results in cases involving privileged 
communications in the prison setting.25
The thesis of this short Article is that the same phenomenon is 
now spilling over into the employment setting. Like some of the 
opinions from the prison setting,26 many of the employee privilege 
cases now use the expression “expectation of privacy,” borrowed
from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, rather than the classical 
privilege terminology “expectation of confidentiality.”27 The first 
Part of this Article addresses the question of whether the same 
confidentiality standard should govern whether the litigant opposing 
the employee is the employer or a third party. Some cases have 
suggested that the standard differs and indicated that an employee 
could assert a privilege against a third party even when the employer 
could defeat the privilege claim. This Part of the Article critiques 
those cases. Admittedly, the protection of a Fourth Amendment 
privacy expectation depends on whether the citizen is asserting the 
expectation against the government rather than a third party. 
However, Fourth Amendment privacy analysis differs fundamentally 
Confidentiality in Privilege Law and a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 57 LOY. L. REV. 1 (2011).
25. See Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24 (criticizing State v. Rollins, 675 
S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 2009)). In Rollins, a spousal conversation occurred in a public 
visiting area of a state prison. 675 S.E.2d at 335. The majority of justices held that 
the spouses had no reasonable expectation of privacy and, hence, no privilege. Id. at 
340.
26. See generally Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457 (RRM)(RML), 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013); Goldstein v. Colborne 
Acquisition Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (stating that courts, such 
as In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), “looked 
to Fourth Amendment case law on expectations of privacy in the workplace”); 
Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935 (S.D. W.
Va. Oct. 31, 2011); In re Royce Homes, 449 B.R. at 736 (stating that the cases “refer 
to the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace 
cases”); United States v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106269, at *27 n.12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon,” No. MDL 2179, 2011 WL 1193030 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011); 
SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig.), 275 
F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Leor Exploration & Prod. L.L.C. v. Aguiar, Nos. 09-
60136-CIV, 09-60683-CIV, 2009 WL 3097207 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2009); Curto v. 
Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006); In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 256; In re Info.
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8168-VCL, 2013 WL 4772670, at *4, *6-9, *12 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 5, 2013); Scott v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (Sup. Ct. 
2007).
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from privilege confidentiality analysis. This Article argues that 
whenever the employee knowingly exposes her communication to 
anyone outside the attorney–client circle—whether that person is the 
employer or a third party—the privilege should not attach.
The second Part of the Article turns to the question of whether 
the employer’s promulgation of a formal policy prohibiting 
employees from making personal use of their work e-mail account 
dictates the conclusion that the employee has no privilege. There are 
cases ruling that the existence of such a policy is dispositive and 
renders the employer’s actual monitoring policy irrelevant. These 
cases state that as a matter of law, the employer policy makes any 
employee expectation of confidentiality unreasonable. In the Fourth 
Amendment context, when the court decides whether a defendant 
citizen’s privacy expectation is “reasonable,” the court makes a 
normative judgment as to whether society ought to be prepared to 
respect the expectation. When a court makes a decision based on a 
normative judgment, it is defensible to render the decision 
categorically as a matter of law. In contrast, when the court 
determines whether a person’s confidentiality expectation is 
reasonable, the court must assess reasonableness in another sense. 
Rather than making a normative decision, the court must determine 
whether it was justifiable or factually reasonable for the person to 
believe that the communication was private and that she can 
maintain privacy in the future. This Article contends that, while in 
privilege analysis the existence of an employer policy prohibiting 
personal use of work e-mail accounts is highly relevant to the court’s
determination, the policy is not necessarily dispositive; in principle, 
the court ought to consider the employer’s actual monitoring 
practice.
I. MAY AN EMPLOYEE ASSERT A PRIVILEGE FOR A PERSONAL WORK 
E-MAIL ACCOUNT MESSAGE TO A CONFIDANT AGAINST A THIRD 
PARTY EVEN IF THE EMPLOYER CAN DEFEAT THE PRIVILEGE 
CLAIM?
A. A Description of the Current State of the Law
Some courts purport to apply the same confidentiality standard 
whether the opponent challenging the privilege claim is a third party 
or the employer who owns the work e-mail account that the 
employee used to communicate with a confidant such as an attorney 
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or spouse.28 Under this view, if the court finds that the employee 
lacked a reasonable expectation of confidentiality against the 
employer, not only can the employer defeat the employee’s privilege 
claim in a lawsuit between employer and employee; a third party 
could also surmount the claim in litigation that does not in any way 
involve the employer. Suppose, for example, that a third party has 
sued the employee for personal injuries. The third party alleges that 
the employee negligently caused her injuries in an accident that has 
nothing to do with the employer; the employee was involved in the 
accident while vacationing in a state in which the employer does not 
even do business. However, during pretrial discovery, the plaintiff 
learns that the employee used her work e-mail account to 
communicate with her attorney or spouse. When the plaintiff seeks 
production of the e-mails, the defendant employee asserts either 
attorney–client or spousal privilege. In these jurisdictions, if the 
court found that the employee did not have a reasonable expectation 
of confidentiality against the employer, that finding would require 
the court to reject the privilege claim and permit discovery by the 
third party.
However, in other jurisdictions the confidentiality standard 
appears to vary, depending on whether the opponent seeking 
discovery is the employer or a third-party stranger. In one of the 
early and still-leading cases, In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.,29 the 
court emphasized that the employer seeking discovery was “the 
owner of the e-mail system.”30 In a 2013 decision, In re Information 
Management Services (IMS), the court wrote:
[T]he premise that an employer’s access to an employee’s work email 
compromises the attorney–client privilege makes the most sense in 
litigation between the employer or its successor-in-interest and the 
employee. . . . Those outside the corporation cannot routinely access work 
email accounts . . . . The corporation and its employees should be on 
28. See, e.g., Reserve Mgmt. Co., 275 F.R.D. at 156 (explaining that the 
opponent seeking discovery was the Securities and Exchange Commission rather 
than the employer); Finazzo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *14 (the opponent 
seeking discovery was the government rather than the employer); In re Oil Spill,
2011 WL 1193030, at *1 (one of the opponents seeking discovery was the 
government).
29. 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
30. Id. at 256; see also Hanson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at *9, *18 
(noting that “such materials were the property of the company” and that the 
company had “ownership of [the] emails”); In re Royce Homes, 449 B.R. at 739 
(noting that the company’s policy provided that “‘[a]ll electronic communications 
are the property of the Company’”).
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different and stronger ground when those outside the corporation seek to 
compel . . . documents that employees have sent using work email. . . . It 
is not clear to me . . . that the analysis translates so easily when the party 
trying to overcome the privilege is not the corporation or its successor-in-
interest.31
As support for his position that there can be confidentiality 
against a third party even when there is no confidentiality against an 
employer, the judge analogized to the selective waiver doctrine.32 In 
some jurisdictions, that doctrine allows a privilege holder to waive a 
privilege by making voluntary disclosure to a government agency 
while preserving the privilege against all third parties.33 A
corporation undergoing a government investigation sometimes
invokes the doctrine when the corporation under investigation finds 
itself in a difficult position.34 On the one hand, the corporation 
realizes that, by cooperating with the government authorities, it may 
persuade the authorities not to file charges or to impose only minor 
sanctions.35 On the other hand, if revealing privileged 
communications to the government waives the privilege as against 
all third parties, in a later lawsuit filed by a third party, the third-
party plaintiff may be able to force the corporation to reveal all the 
communications previously disclosed to the government.36 The 
corporation might have tremendous potential exposure in such a 
lawsuit. The corporation’s fear of that exposure may be so great that 
the corporation feels compelled to refuse to cooperate with the 
government investigation. That refusal may impede the 
government’s efforts to protect the public interest. Some courts 
recognize the selective waiver doctrine in order to eliminate that 
fear; by virtue of the doctrine, the privilege holder can waive the 
privilege as to the government while maintaining its ability to assert 
the privilege against third parties. In the mind of the judge in IMS,
when, despite an employer’s policy banning personal use of work 
accounts, an employee uses such an account to communicate with a 
confidant, the employee has foregone any privilege claim against the 
employer, but possibly retains the claim against third-party 
outsiders.37
31. 2013 WL 4772670, at *12.
32. Id. at *14.
33. Id.; 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.12.4, at 1013.
34. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.12.4, at 1010-20 (discussing 
selective waiver). 
35. See In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *14.
36. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.12.4, at 1020.
37. In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *14.
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B. A Critical Evaluation of the Current Split of Authority
The courts subscribing to the latter view misconceive the 
confidentiality requirement in privilege law. To be privileged, a 
communication must be “confidential.”38 The party now claiming the 
privilege must have had a certain state of mind at the time of the 
communication: she must have believed that her conversation with 
the confidant was private;39 and, in addition, she must have had both 
the intent to and a belief in her ability40 to maintain confidentiality in 
the future.41 As a general proposition, if at the time of the 
communication she knew that a third party outside of the circle of 
confidence could hear or read the communication, the requisite 
confidentiality is lacking.42 Likewise, even when there was physical 
privacy at the time of the communication with a confidant such as an 
attorney, confidentiality is wanting if the claimant realized that the 
confidant would later publicly disclose the communication, for 
example, by including the information in a court filing.43 In certain 
contexts, the availability of legal protection for privacy depends on 
the existence of an expectation of privacy against a particular person 
or entity. As Professors Mosteller and Broun noted, the existence of 
constitutional protection for privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
turns on whether the citizen had an expectation of privacy against 
intrusions by the government.44 There is a parallel under the work-
product protection, which is designed to encourage litigants to 
prepare diligently; the rationale is that if the litigant knew he had to 
share all his preparatory materials with his opponent, the litigant 
would be deterred from thoroughly investigating his case.45 Given 
that rationale, the litigant forfeits work-product protection only when 
38. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.8, at 765.
39. Id. § 6.8.1, at 772-73.
40. Suppose, for example, that the claimant had made a disclosure about 
child sexual abuse to a person such as a therapist whom the claimant knew was 
statutorily obliged to report the information to the authorities. See 2 IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 15, § 6.13.2, at 1163-66. The person could hardly claim that he had a 
reasonable belief that he would be able to maintain the confidentiality of the 
information.
41. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.8.2, at 806.
42. See id. § 6.8.1, at 781 n.61 (collecting cases in which confidentiality 
was lacking).
43. Id. § 6.8.2, at 813-15.
44. Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24, at 170-78.
45. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney–Client 
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 383-84 (1990).
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he discloses the information in question to his actual or potential 
adversary46 or to someone likely to relay the information to the 
adversary.47
For that matter, the identity of the party resisting the privilege 
claim may be pertinent if the privilege in question was qualified 
rather than absolute. It is true that even “absolute” communication
privileges, such as attorney–client and spousal, can be waived and 
are subject to exceptions announced beforehand, such as the 
crime/fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege.48 However, 
unlike qualified privileges, absolute privileges cannot be surmounted 
by a case-specific, ad hoc showing of a need for the privileged 
information.49 The policy justification for categorizing a privilege as 
absolute in this sense is the assumption that, at the very time she has 
to decide whether to consult the confidant, the client or spouse must 
be able to be confident that an opponent will be unable to 
subsequently persuade a court to override the privilege on the basis 
46. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 295 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that unlike the attorney–client privilege, the work-
product doctrine protects information only from opposing parties); Great Am. 
Assurance Co. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (explaining that “[u]nlike for the attorney–client privilege,” waiver of the 
work-product protection requires an act that “substantially increases the possibility 
of an opposing party obtaining the information”); United States v. Deloitte & 
Touche USA L.L.P., 623 F. Supp. 2d 39, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the 
disclosure of work-product to a subpoenaed party, an auditor, did not waive the 
work-product protection because the auditor was not a potential adversary), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Deloitte L.L.P., 610 F.3d 129 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, No. C-05-0686 SBA (EMC), 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48841, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2007) (stating that the work-
product protection is waived by a disclosure to a third party who discloses the 
information to an adversary); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 262-
63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Meza v. H. Muehlstein & Co., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 431 
(Ct. App. 2009); Scott v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 443 (Sup. Ct. 
2007); see also Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business out of Work 
Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1898-99 (2011) (“The work product doctrine is 
generally designed to be less easily waived than is the attorney–client privilege. . . . 
[M]ost courts hold that waiver occurs only when disclosure enables access to the 
confidential information by an adversary.”).
47. See, e.g., Nidec Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48841, at *8-9.
48. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 3.2.4, at 167-71.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(stating that “‘[p]rivilege cannot be overcome by a showing of need’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 881 
F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989))); Admiral Ins. Co., 881 F.2d at 1493-94; United 
States v. Grice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 428, 431 n.13 (D.S.C. 1998).
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of a showing of need.50 In some states and at the lower federal court 
level, there is a trend toward classifying privileges as qualified, 
subject to the condition that the opponent may defeat the privilege 
claim by establishing a compelling, overpowering need for the 
information.51 If the employee’s attorney–client privilege were
qualified, it would be pertinent to note—as the IMS court did—that 
the employer–owner of the e-mail system has a “stronger” claim to 
the information than a third-party stranger.52
However, that consideration is irrelevant when the privilege is 
absolute, as the attorney–client privilege is. When that is the nature 
of the privilege in question, as a general proposition confidentiality is 
initially lacking if, at the time of the communication, the privilege 
claimant knew that any person outside the circle of confidence could 
discover the information; and even if the privilege initially attached, 
the claimant waives the privilege by disclosing to any stranger 
outside the circle.53 In the case of the attorney–client privilege, with 
few exceptions, the circle of confidence includes only the client and 
her confidant attorney. If the client knows that any other person has 
access to the communication or that the communication will be 
disclosed to such a person, confidentiality is lacking.54 The employer 
falls outside the circle of confidence shared by the employee and her 
attorney. Hence, if the employee using a work e-mail account 
reasonably understands that the employer has access to the 
50. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 3.2.4, at 169-70.
51. Id. § 5.4.4(b), at 484-91.
52. See In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8168-VCL, 2013 WL 4772670, 
at *12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2013).
53. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 287, 289 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that the attorney–client privilege did not attach because statements were 
made in front of “strangers”); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 
(5th Cir. 1975) (holding that communications made to “strangers” cannot be 
considered confidential); Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F.2d 749, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 1948) 
(stating that the presence of “a third person . . . generally rebuts the presumption of 
confidentiality”); United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457 (RRM)(RML), 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (“[A] third party . . . 
eliminates whatever privilege the communication may have originally possessed.”);
SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig.), 275 
F.R.D. 154, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (using the phrase “a third party”); People v. 
Layne, 677 N.E.2d 469, 475 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (using the phrase “a third person”); 
In re Marriage of Johnson, 604 N.E.2d 378, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (using the 
phrase “a third party”); Matthews v. State, 598 A.2d 813, 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1991) (using the phrase “a third party”).
54. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.8.1, at 781-82; 2 IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 15, § 6.12.4, at 996-1093.
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communication to her attorney conveyed through the work account, 
confidentiality is missing; and consequently, the employee cannot
assert the privilege against either the employer or a third party. 
As the preceding paragraph suggested, there are a few 
exceptional situations in which the courts have expanded the circle 
of confidence and will find the requisite confidentiality even when 
someone other than the attorney and client was privy to the 
communication. By way of example, if the client is not fluent in 
English, the presence of an interpreter to facilitate communication 
with the attorney will not negate confidentiality.55 The interpreter’s
presence is necessary to facilitate communication between the 
attorney and client. Or, if the third party is a person, such as a 
spouse, with whom the client has a separate privileged relationship,
the third party’s presence does not prevent the attorney–client 
privilege from attaching.56 The most liberal courts tolerate the 
presence of third parties, such as relatives and close friends, whose 
attendance furnishes the client with moral support.57 However, none 
of those exceptions applies here. The employee does not require the 
employer to interpret for her or serve as an intermediary with her 
attorney, the employee does not have a separate privileged 
relationship with the employer, and the employer does not provide 
moral support for the employee’s interaction with her attorney. The 
bottomline is that when the employee knows that the employer has 
access to the employee’s communication with the confidant, that 
knowledge negates confidentiality—whether the employee is 
asserting the privilege against the employer or a third-party stranger. 
To hold otherwise is to distort the concept of confidentiality in 
privilege law by confusing it with the notions of privacy employed in 
other legal contexts.
Since privileges obstruct the search for truth in the courtroom, 
they are not favored.58 Rather, even recognized, existing privileges 
are narrowly construed,59 and their scope is confined to situations in 
55. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.8.1, at 782-83.
56. Id. at 784.
57. Id. at 799-802.
58. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholas, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123-24
(C.D. Cal. 2008); Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., L.L.C., 663 F.3d 6, 23-26 (1st Cir.
2011) (stating that the attorney–client privilege is “narrowly” construed); Shaffer v. 
Am. Med. Ass’n, 662 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that the attorney–client 
privilege is “narrowly” construed); In re Royce Homes, L.P., 449 B.R. 709, 726
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); Arista Records L.L.C. v. Lime Grp. L.L.C., 784 F. Supp. 
2d 398, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the attorney–client privilege is “narrowly . 
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which their application serves their policy justification.60 The 
essential policy purpose of absolute communications privileges is to 
protect the confidentiality of certain intimate social relations such as 
attorney—client and spousal—special relationships that, in Dean 
Wigmore’s words, society has decided to “sedulously foster[].”61 It 
does not serve that policy to apply the privilege when the privilege 
claimant has knowingly or recklessly exposed the content of a 
communication with a confidant to a third party outside the protected 
relationship. The claimant has not treated the communication as a 
confidential one with the confidant, and consequently the law should 
not extend the privilege to the communication.
C. The Counterargument Based on the Analogy to Selective Waiver
What about the counterargument based on the analogy to the 
selective waiver doctrine in the recent IMS decision? That analogy is 
of no avail. Concededly, there is respectable authority supporting the 
selective waiver doctrine.62 However, what the IMS court neglected 
to mention is that the overwhelming majority63 of courts reject the 
doctrine.64 According to the First Circuit, there is only “a trace of 
support for” selective waiver.65 With the exception of the Eighth 
. . defined”); Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 (N.D. Ill. 
2010); KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (D. Del. 
2010).
60. See, e.g., Solis v. Food Emp’rs Labor Relations Ass’n, 644 F.3d 221, 
226 (4th Cir. 2011) (construing the privilege to the “the narrowest possible limits”);
Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2012); 
Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at *16-
17 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011); United States v. Singhal, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8
(D.D.C. 2011).
61. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (photo. reprint 2003) (1905).
62. See, e.g., In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8168-VCL, 2013 WL 
4772670, at *14 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2013).
63. See Conference Speakers Highlight Risks Pertaining to Corporate 
Counsel, 70 U.S.L.W. 2637 (2002) (stating that “in the ‘vast majority’ of 
jurisdictions waiver cannot be avoided”).
64. See Pac. Pictures Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (In 
re Pac. Pictures Corp.), 679 F.3d 1121, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to adopt 
the selective waiver doctrine in accordance with the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, District of Columbia, and Federal circuits); 1 EDNA 
SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 494-507 (5th ed. 2007) (providing a circuit-by-circuit view of the case 
law on selective waiver); 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 6.12.4, at 1014-18.
65. United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 1995).
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Circuit that originally minted the doctrine,66 every federal circuit that 
has addressed the issue has refused to permit selective waiver.67 In 
the words of one of the leading cases rejecting selective waiver, 
consistent with the concept of confidentiality, a privilege claimant 
may not “pick and choose among his opponents.”68 With the few 
exceptions mentioned above, the claimant must either disclose the
communication to or withhold the communication from all third 
parties outside the circle of confidence. If the employee–claimant 
expressly or impliedly consents to disclosure to her employer, she 
cannot invoke a privilege to withhold a relevant communication from 
third parties in subsequent litigation. That result follows as a 
corollary of the elementary confidentiality requirement.
II. DOES AN EMPLOYER’S PROMULGATION OF A FORMAL POLICY 
BANNING PERSONAL USE OF EMPLOYEE WORK E-MAIL ACCOUNTS 
NEGATE CONFIDENTIALITY AND RENDER THE EMPLOYER’S ACTUAL 
MONITORING PRACTICE IRRELEVANT?
A. A Description of the Current State of the Law
The published employee privilege opinions have identified 
several factors that trial judges may consider in deciding whether to 
uphold the employee’s privilege claim.69 Two frequently mentioned 
66. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 
1977).
67. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12
(D. Mass. 2004); Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, UnWaiver, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 
4, 2005, at 11.
68. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
69. In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8168-VCL, 2013 WL 4772670, at *7
(Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2013) (stating that one consideration is whether the employee took 
steps to maintain the privacy of the files, “such as password-protection, encryption, 
or deletion”); Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 935-36
(N.D. Ill. 2012); Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125935, at *16-17 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 2011); In re Royce Homes, L.P., 449 B.R. 
709, 735 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); United States v. Nagle, No. 1:09-CR-384, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104711, at *11-12 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010); Scott v. Beth Isr.
Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (distinguishing between 
People v. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 204 (Ct. App. 2005), where “Jiang ‘made 
substantial efforts to protect the documents from disclosure by password-protecting 
them,’” and the instant case); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[A] court should consider four factors: (1) does the 
corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other objectionable use, (2) does 
the company monitor the use of the employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third 
parties have a right of access to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation 
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factors are especially noteworthy: the employer’s promulgation of a 
formal policy banning personal use of work e-mail accounts and the 
employer’s actual monitoring practice.70 The crucial questions are 
the relative weight of the two factors and the factors’ relationship.71
One conceivable approach is to hold that the decision whether 
to uphold the employee’s privilege claim ought to be made on a 
case-by-case basis.72 This is a flexible approach enabling the trial 
judge to weigh all the factors and decide, based on the specific facts 
of the case, how much weight to assign to each factor. A proponent 
of this position can point to the myriad of possible wordings of 
employer work e-mail account policies and the similarly wide range 
of potential monitoring practices.73 Given the large number of 
possible permutations of the two factors, it seems wrong minded to 
announce rigid rules about the factors’ relative importance.
However, a competing line of authority appears to do precisely 
that—namely, announce that the existence of a formal employer 
policy banning personal use is dispositive. This line of cases elevates 
that factor to the status of a litmus test. There is a wealth of authority 
in this line.74 These cases hold that, at least as a practical matter, an 
outright employer ban on personal use of work e-mail accounts 
“end[s] the privilege inquiry at the start.”75 When there is such a 
formal employer policy, these courts “routinely” reject the 
employee’s privilege claim.76 These courts sometimes assert that in 
the final analysis, since the employee is using the employer’s e-mail 
system, the employee’s message is “the property of” the employer.77
notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring 
policies?” (footnote omitted)).
70. See In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *4-7.
71. See United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CR-457 (RRM)(RML), 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *26-28 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (“Courts are not in 
universal agreement on the matter.”).
72. See In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *4-5.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 106269, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009) (holding that the employer’s
failure to monitor is relevant).
74. See SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative 
Litig.), 275 F.R.D. 154, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases regarding formal 
employer policies and privileged e-mails).
75. Finazzo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *25.
76. Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d
548, 559-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
77. Miller v. Blattner, 676 F. Supp. 2d 485, 497 (E.D. La. 2009). 
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“Most courts have concluded” that the promulgation of the employer 
policy precludes the employee from making a valid privilege claim.78
Since these courts conclude that the factor of the existence of 
the employer policy is dispositive, logically they dismiss the second 
factor of the employer’s actual monitoring practice. In their mind, 
when there is a formal employer policy banning personal use, the 
employer’s historical79 monitoring practice is absolutely 
“immaterial”80 or “irrelevant.”81 Thus, the second factor is entitled to 
no weight at all. If there is a formal employer ban on personal use of 
work accounts, the trial judge can disregard any testimony about the 
employer’s actual monitoring practice and without any hesitation 
overrule the employee’s privilege claim.
B. A Critical Evaluation of the Current Split of Authority
As the Introduction notes, in recent years there has been a 
growing judicial tendency to equate a privacy expectation under the 
Fourth Amendment with a confidentiality expectation under 
privilege law.82 There certainly are similarities between the two 
concepts. Privacy and confidentiality are kindred notions. Moreover, 
there are obvious linguistic similarities. After the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Katz v. United States,83 the courts have 
consistently ruled that a defendant has a cognizable Fourth 
Amendment claim only if he can demonstrate that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy84—the expression that Justice 
Harlan coined in his famous concurrence in Katz.85 For their part, the 
78. Finazzo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479, at *26-27; see also Hanson v. 
First Nat’l Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at *21 (S.D. W. 
Va. Oct. 31, 2011).
79. In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *7.
80. Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 898 (Ct. App. 
2011).
81. In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *6; In re Royce Homes, 
L.P., 449 B.R. 709, 739 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); United States v. Etkin, No. 07-CR-
913 (KMK), 2008 WL 482281, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008).
82. See generally Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24; see also Convertino v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 2009).
83. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Edelman, 726 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Flores v. Lackage, 938 F. Supp. 2d 759, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
85. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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privilege cases also demand that the privilege claimant establish that 
she had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.86
Despite these superficial similarities, there are profound 
differences between a privacy expectation for Fourth Amendment 
purposes and a confidentiality expectation under privilege law. To 
begin with, the expectations must exist at different times. Under the 
Fourth Amendment, the question is whether the defendant had the 
requisite expectation at the time of the government intrusion.87
However, under privilege law, the critical time is not when the 
opponent seeks discovery of the privileged communication; rather, 
the issue is whether the claimant had the confidentiality expectation 
earlier at the time of the communication with the confidant.88 In 
addition, as Section I.B explains, while the Fourth Amendment 
requirement is an expectation of privacy from government intrusion, 
the privilege requirement is a belief and intent with respect to 
secrecy against all third parties outside the circle of confidence.89
However, those distinctions do not exhaust the differences 
between the two notions. In Katz, Justice Harlan stated that to be 
reasonable, the privacy expectation must “be one that society is 
prepared to recognize.”90 In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
expectation must be reasonable in a legal or normative sense.91
Weighing the societal stake in the enforcement of the criminal law 
the defendant allegedly violated against the magnitude of the 
defendant’s privacy interest, the judge decides whether the balance 
should be struck in favor of upholding the privacy interest.92 The 
86. See, e.g., SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re Reserve Fund Sec. & 
Derivative Litig.), 275 F.R.D. 154, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Hanson v. First Nat’l
Bank, No. 5:10-0906, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125935, at *18 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 31, 
2011); State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1131 (N.J. 2010); In re Asia Global Crossing, 
Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 256-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 
15, § 6.8.1, at 772-73 nn.35-36, § 6.8.2, at 806 n.187 (collecting cases discussing the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in communications as well as company e-mails);
Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney 
and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27 (2011).
87. Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 12-13.
88. Id. at 13-15.
89. See supra Section I.B.
90. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Curto v. Med. World 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 15, 2006); In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 257.
91. Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24, at 171-72.
92. Id. at 170, 179.
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decision turns on a value judgment,93 which can be based on 
categorical policy norms.94
Although, like the Fourth Amendment cases, the privilege 
decisions use the adjective “reasonable” to describe the claimant’s
expectation of confidentiality, the privilege cases employ the 
adjective in a very different sense.95 In privilege law, the question is 
whether the claimant’s belief was reasonable in a factual sense.96 At 
the time of the communication, was the claimant objectively justified 
in believing that no third parties were overhearing or intercepting the 
communication with the confidant?97 Again, at that time, was the 
claimant rationally warranted in intending and believing that, in the 
future, she would be able to deny access to third parties outside the 
circle of confidence?98 Rather than making a normative judgment 
about the social acceptability of the person’s expectation, in privilege 
law, the judge assesses whether there was a factual justification or 
warrant for the claimant’s state of mind.
If in privilege cases the judge was supposed to make an 
essentially normative judgment, it would make sense to prescribe 
categorical rules about the weight of factors, such as the existence of 
a formal employer policy banning personal use of work e-mail 
accounts. A judge could rationally conclude that whenever the 
employer has gone to that length, society need not accord legal 
protection to the employee’s contrary expectation. However, as 
previously stated, that is not the character of the judgment that the 
judge must make under privilege law. Instead, the question is the 
impact of the various factors, including any employer policy, on the 
employee’s state of mind. When the question is cast in those terms, 
the wide “‘variety of work environments’”99 makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to defend the enunciation of sweeping, categorical rules.
93. Id. at 172-73; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) 
(holding that the court must examine “our societal understanding” concerning what 
deserves “protection from government invasion”); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(d), at 440-43 (4th ed. 
2004); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 403 (1974).
94. Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24, at 173.
95. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 93, § 2.1(d), at 444 (distinguishing between 
the two different senses and perspectives on reasonableness). 
96. Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24, at 171-73.
97. Id. at 162, 165, 171-73.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
99. SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative 
Litig.), 275 F.R.D. 154, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 
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First, consider the employer policy itself. There is no uniform 
employer “policy” regulating work e-mail accounts. There is no 
mandatory legislative prescription for the content of employer 
policies. Research does not even reveal a private national 
organization that requires all its members to adopt the same 
employer policy for work accounts.100 A policy could contain 
forceful language such as “absolutely prohibited”101 to forbid 
personal use of the accounts, or the policy might include much 
weaker phrasing such as “should” or “discouraged.” Likewise, even 
if the policy includes some language restricting the personal use of 
the account, the policy might be silent on or ambiguous about 
enforcement mechanisms and monitoring. A change in the wording 
of the policy could have a significant impact on the employee’s
belief and state of mind.102
Second, although it has a formal policy strongly prohibiting 
personal use of work e-mail accounts, the employer might make
inconsistent statements to the employee in question.103 By way of 
example, consider the following plausible scenario. Assume that 
after several incidents of theft of proprietary trade secrets, an 
U.S. 709, 718 (1987)); In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8168-VCL, 2013 WL 
4772670, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2013) (quoting In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 
322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
100. For example, neither the United States Chamber of Commerce nor the 
National Association of Manufacturers appears to have adopted such a mandatory 
policy. Visits to the websites of both organizations reveal that neither organization 
has mandated a standard for its members. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.,
https://www.uschamber.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); NAT’L ASS’N OF 
MANUFACTURERS, http://www.nam.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 106269, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009) (noting that the employer’s 
policy made several specific activities “strictly prohibited”); see also In re Royce 
Homes, L.P., 449 B.R. 709, 738-39 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (discussing how some 
employer policies use bolding and capitalized letters to emphasize the point).
102. In Curto v. Medical World Communications, Inc., No. 03CV6327 
(DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006), the employer 
policy stated only that the company “may use human or automated means to monitor 
use of computer resources.” The court noted that the wording of the policy was 
ambiguous. Id. at *6; see also In re Royce Homes, 449 B.R. at 738-39 (noting the 
differences between the use of “equivocal” and unequivocal language in a policy).
103. See, e.g., In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., 2013 WL 4772670, at *6 (“[I]f an 
employer reserves the right to monitor work email, then whether it actually does so 
is irrelevant, the employer’s actual conduct with respect to monitoring remains an 
appropriate factor to consider, particularly if the employer has made specific 
representations or taken specific actions inconsistent with the [announced] policy . . 
. .”).
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employer issues a policy stating in sweeping terms that in the future, 
it intends to “regularly and aggressively” monitor employee e-mails. 
On its face, the wording of the policy undeniably cuts against a 
finding that the employee retains a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality in e-mails on the work account. However, shortly 
after the issuance of the new policy, the employee in question 
approaches her superior and inquires about the policy. In response, 
the superior says: 
You don’t have to worry about it. The boss issued that policy only because 
he suspects that a couple of the research and development guys accessed 
some of our trade secrets and sold them to competitors. You don’t even 
have any computer access to that type of data. Your account isn’t one of 
the ones we’ll be checking.
It is submitted that in this scenario, notwithstanding the broad 
wording of the policy, the employee could have a rationally justified 
confidentiality expectation.
Finally, consider the relevance of the employer’s actual 
monitoring policy. It costs the employer time and money to monitor. 
Effective monitoring may require expensive “special monitoring 
software” or the training of monitoring personnel in hacking
techniques.104 Assume arguendo that the employer previously issued 
a formal written policy announcing aggressive monitoring and that 
no superior has ever assured the employee that her work account will 
not be monitored. Yet, the employee might discover that the 
employer is experiencing financial problems and that, as a cost-
cutting measure, the employer has quietly discontinued its 
monitoring program. In this situation, the employer’s written policy 
is not worth the paper that it is written on. Once again, despite the 
breadth of the wording of the formal policy, the employee could be 
warranted in believing that the employer will not breach the 
confidentiality of the employee’s communications with her attorney 
or spouse.105
As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, if the question is the 
factual reasonableness of the employee’s expectation, the single 
factor of the existence of an employer policy should not be 
104. Id. at *7. The monitoring personnel might have to resort to hacking 
techniques if the employer in question had used password protection, encryption, or 
deletion to protect her e-mail to a confidant. Id.
105. In Curto, the magistrate found that “the lack of enforcement by [the 
company] of its computer usage policy created a ‘false sense of security’ which 
‘lull[ed]’ employees into believing that the policy would not be enforced.” 2006 WL
1318387, at *3.
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dispositive. Other considerations, including an employer’s contrary 
oral statements or actual monitoring policies, could trump that factor 
and permit the employee to entertain a sufficiently reasonable 
confidentiality expectation to satisfy privilege law. All of these 
considerations are part of the totality of circumstances that can 
impact the objective reasonableness of the employee’s expectation.
In the last two hypotheticals, while an employer policy cut in 
favor of rejecting a privilege claim, other factors countervailed, 
permitting the employee to nevertheless retain a reasonable 
confidentiality expectation. However, it would be a mistake to leap 
to the conclusion that the other factors will always point toward the 
conclusion that the court should uphold a privilege claim. If all these 
factors are relevant, but none is automatically dispositive, the end 
result of the judge’s analysis might lead to the contrary conclusion. 
For example, assume that although the employer did not have a 
formal policy, the employee realizes that in fact the employer is 
regularly monitoring a significant percentage of the e-mails on the 
work accounts. On that assumption, a court might find that the 
employee lacked the reasonable confidentiality expectation required 
to sustain a privilege claim. Here, the consideration of the 
monitoring factor would lead to the denial of the claim. However, it 
is clear that in the typical case in jurisdictions currently holding that 
any strongly worded employer policy automatically precludes a 
privilege claim, the abandonment of that holding will eliminate a 
rigid barrier to a successful privilege claim.
C. The Counterargument Based on the Supposed Need for Bright-
line Privilege Rules
Before concluding the analysis, though, we must address the 
counterargument that, since this issue relates to privilege law, it is 
especially desirable to formulate bright-line standards, such as a 
holding that any firmly worded employer policy forecloses a 
privilege claim.106 American privilege law still reflects the influence 
of Dean Henry Wigmore.107 Wigmore believed that the typical 
layperson, such as a client, was so fearful of later-compelled judicial 
disclosure of her communications with a confidant that she would 
106. See M. Brett Fulkerson, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The 
Recognized but Undefined Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 62 MO. L.
REV. 401, 421 (1997).
107. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 3.2.2, at 157-58.
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not confer with the confidant without the assurance of confidentiality 
provided by an absolute evidentiary privilege.108 That is why he 
strongly advocated stating privilege rules in sharply defined, bright-
line terms.109 Wigmore feared that vaguely worded rules would not 
provide the firm assurance needed to allay the layperson’s fear about 
later-compelled disclosure.110 The Supreme Court itself has echoed 
Wigmore’s fear.
A case in point is the Court’s decision in Upjohn Co. v. United 
States.111 When Upjohn Company learned that some of its 
subsidiaries might have made illegal payments to foreign officials, 
the corporation tasked its counsel to conduct an internal 
investigation.112 During the investigation, corporate counsel 
interviewed numerous employees.113 Later, the IRS subpoenaed the 
corporation’s records documenting the interviews.114 The company
resisted the subpoena on privilege grounds.115
The Upjohn case posed the question of whether and to what 
extent the attorney–client privilege ought to protect corporate 
employees’ communications with corporate counsel. The very first 
secondary authority cited in Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion 
is Wigmore’s treatise.116 The Court voiced the concern that a weak 
privilege would “discourag[e] the communication of [highly] 
relevant information [by lower-level] employees . . . to attorneys 
seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation.”117 Clients
need to feel “safe[]” in revealing sensitive information to their 
counsel.118 According to the Court, clients “must be able to predict 
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected.”119 The majority then added its oft-quoted assertion that 
108. Id. § 3.2.4, at 168, § 5.4.4, at 478; Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of 
Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 31, 34; Steven R. 
Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 48 
(1980).
109. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 3.2.4, at 169.
110. Id. § 5.4.4, at 478. 
111. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
112. Id. at 386-87.
113. Id. at 387.
114. Id. at 387-88.
115. Id. at 388.
116. Id. at 389 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 
ed. 1961)).
117. Id. at 392.
118. Id. at 389 (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)). 
119. Id. at 393.
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“[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain . . . is 
little better than no privilege at all.”120
In this context, it might be argued that a standard that does not 
give dispositive weight to employer policies is intolerably uncertain. 
However, that argument is not unanswerable. To begin with, the 
empirical studies of privileges do not validate Wigmore’s
assumption that, but for the existence of a formal absolute 
evidentiary privilege, the typical layperson would be unwilling to 
consult with and disclose to confidants such as attorneys and 
psychotherapists.121 Is it really plausible that a patient in excruciating 
pain would not reveal requested information to a physician 
attempting to alleviate the pain or save the patient’s life?122 The 
world does not revolve around the courtroom to the degree that 
Wigmore posited. Without the benefit of a clearly worded, absolute 
privilege, some laypersons would be deterred from consulting, and 
written communication would likely be more circumspect; but the 
available data simply does not prove the proposition that, in most 
cases, the layperson would not communicate absent an absolute 
privilege.123
Moreover, despite the Court’s strong rhetoric, the reality is that 
the Upjohn Court itself did not announce a bright-line, categorical 
rule. Although the Court upheld the corporation’s privilege claim in 
that case, the Court stopped short of issuing a categorical rule. 
Rather, the Court cautioned that it was not establishing a rule “to 
govern all conceivable future questions in this area.”124 As one 
commentator observed:
In Upjohn . . . the Court placed heavy emphasis on the ability of the IRS to 
gather the evidence it needed directly from the corporation’s employees. 
Indeed, the Upjohn Company provided the IRS with a list of the eighty-six 
persons interviewed by its counsel, and the IRS had already conducted 
120. Id.
121. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.2.2, at 324-30 (collecting and 
reviewing the published empirical studies).
122. See id. § 5.2.1, at 297-98 (discussing the common sense doubts about 
underlying behavioral assumptions).
123. See id. § 5.2.2, at 324; Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney–
Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 264, 370-
71, 374 (1989); Edward Imwinkelried, The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: 
The Weakness of the Supreme Court’s Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 49 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 974-82 (1998); Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of 
Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 320-22 (2003).
124. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
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twenty-five of its own interviews. . . . The Court’s [stated] preference for 
case-by-case development . . . leave[s] room for a measure of flexibility. . 
. . [I]f Upjohn’s employees had proven to be either obstructive or 
unavailable during the course of discovery, perhaps a different result 
would have been reached.125
The case for a bright-line test is especially weak in this setting.
Again, the most famous passage in the Upjohn opinion is Chief 
Justice Burger’s declaration that “[a]n uncertain privilege . . . is little 
better than no privilege at all.”126 The bright-line standard followed 
by these courts is that the employer’s promulgation of a formal 
policy restricting personal use of work e-mail accounts necessitates 
the rejection of the employee’s privilege claim—resulting in no 
privilege. The rhetorical flourish in Upjohn notwithstanding, the 
Court does say that an uncertain privilege “is . . . better than no 
privilege at all.”127 That is the stark choice here, either: (1) treating 
the issuance of an employer policy as the basis for a bright-line rule 
barring a privilege claim; or (2) according some weight to other 
factors, such as the employer’s historical monitoring practice. The 
former approach undeniably yields considerable predictability, but at 
the cost of eliminating even the faintest possibility of a successful 
privilege claim by an employee—no matter how factually reasonable 
the employee’s expectation is in the totality of the circumstances. To 
be sure, the latter approach may produce some uncertainty, but it 
opens up the possibility of a successful claim by the employee by 
enabling the judge to consider all the factors that affect the 
rationality of the employee’s expectation.
III. CONCLUSION
As the Introduction notes, the number of employee e-mails sent 
annually is massive, easily exceeding one trillion.128 Given the 
amount of time that employees spend at work, it is virtually 
inevitable that employees often put their work e-mail accounts to 
personal use, including communicating with confidants such as 
attorneys, psychotherapists, and spouses. In turn, that development 
made it probable that employers would begin regulating employees’
personal use of such accounts. As we have seen, the existence of 
those regulations gave rise to the question of whether those 
125. Alexander, supra note 123, at 378-79 (footnotes omitted).
126. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
127. Id.
128. Nimsger, supra note 4.
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employee e-mails lack the confidentiality needed to qualify for 
evidentiary privileges. That general question has spawned a large 
number of judicial splits of authority.129
This brief Article discusses only two of those divisions of 
authority. Part I initially describes the split of authority over the 
question of whether an employee could assert a privilege against a 
third-party stranger even if the court found that the employer’s
access to the content of the employee’s e-mail would negate 
confidentiality in litigation between the employer and employee. Part 
I argues that that question should be answered in the negative. If the 
employee could not successfully assert the privilege in litigation with 
the employer, the employee should not be permitted to do so in 
litigation with a third party. Part II reviews the division of judicial 
sentiment over the relation between two key factors relevant to 
confidentiality: namely, the existence of a formal employer policy 
restricting personal use and the employer’s actual monitoring 
practice. Part II contends that although the existence of an employer 
policy is highly relevant, that factor does not automatically deserve 
the dispositive weight that many courts presently accord it.
Hopefully, this Article has not only exposed the flaws in the 
two lines of authority critiqued in Parts I and II. At a deeper level,
this Article has attempted to demonstrate that in the final analysis, 
those flaws are attributable to misunderstandings of the fundamental 
requirement of confidentiality. Part I emphasizes that confidentiality 
in privilege law differs from kindred privacy notions in other legal 
settings, such as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and work-product 
protection. The Fourth Amendment shields privacy against only 
government intrusions, and similarly, the purpose of the work-
product doctrine is to deny access to adversaries in actual or potential 
litigation. However, privilege confidentiality is stricter; it is 
operative against every person or entity outside the inner circle of 
confidence. Thus, with few exceptions, if the employee knowingly 
exposes the content of the otherwise-privileged communication to 
anyone outside that circle—whether that person is the employee’s
employer or a third-party stranger—confidentiality is lacking.
Part II elaborates on another distinction between a 
confidentiality expectation in privilege law and a privacy expectation 
under the Fourth Amendment. It is true that the courts declare that 
both expectations must be “reasonable,” but the meaning of 
129. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (reviewing cases and articles
involving the issue of privileged e-mails).
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reasonableness differs fundamentally in the two settings. In the 
Fourth Amendment setting, “reasonable” has a normative 
connotation: As a matter of policy, should society be prepared to 
respect the expectation? In contrast, in the privilege setting, 
“reasonable” has a very different, factual connotation: Given all the 
surrounding circumstances, was the employee rationally, objectively 
justified in believing that her communication was private at the time 
and that she would be able to maintain secrecy in the future?130 In 
that light, it is wrong minded to embrace the view that the existence 
of an employer policy always ends the analysis and requires the 
denial of the privilege claim. As Part II explains, notwithstanding the 
employer’s formally announced policy, in some cases an employer’s
oral statements to the employee or the employer’s historical 
monitoring practice could lead an employee to form a reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality. This view can yield some uncertainty, 
but even the Upjohn Court acknowledged that, on occasion, an 
uncertain privilege is better than no privilege at all.131
Of course, the courts should strive to resolve the particular 
disputes described in Parts I and II in a sensible manner. However, 
the courts ought to look beyond the microcosm of those individual 
splits of authority and focus more broadly on the macrocosm. The 
macrocosm issue is protecting the basic concept of confidentiality 
from distortion. Confidentiality is the central notion in modern 
privilege law.132 As we have seen, the application of the 
confidentiality requirement is the pivotal issue in more than three 
quarters of the published privilege opinions.133 The number of 
employee privilege cases is skyrocketing, and it is therefore vital to 
safeguard the integrity of the confidentiality concept in this emerging 
type of litigation.
130. See Mosteller & Broun, supra note 24, at 162, 165, 171-73.
131. See 449 U.S. at 393; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 
U.S. 399, 408-09 (1998).
132. See In re Royce Homes, L.P., 449 B.R. 709, 722-23 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2011); HIXSON, supra note 21, at 7; 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 15, § 5.3.3, at 360-
61.
133. See Rice, supra note 22.

